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Abstract 
This paper uses Guangzhou’s experience of hosting the 2010 Asian Games to illustrate 
Guangzhou’s engagement with scalar politics. This includes concurrent processes of intra-
regional restructuring to position Guangzhou as a central city in south China and a ‘negotiated 
scale-jump’ to connect with the world under conditions negotiated in part with the overarching 
strong central state, testing the limit of Guangzhou’s geopolitical expansion. Guangzhou’s 
attempts were aided further by using the Asian Games as a vehicle for addressing condensed 
urban spatial restructuring to enhance its own production/accumulation capacities, and for 
facilitating urban redevelopment projects to achieve a ‘global’ appearance and exploit the city’s 
real estate development potential. Guangzhou’s experience of hosting the Games provides 
important lessons for expanding our understanding of how regional cities may pursue their 
development goals under the strong central state and how event-led development contributes to 
this. 
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Introduction 
In November 2010, Guangzhou received an international spotlight as the host of the Summer 
Asian Games. This was the culminating moment of six-year preparation after winning the bid. 
Having taken place two years after the Beijing Olympic Games and only one month after the 
closing of the Shanghai World Expo, the Guangzhou Asian Games was China’s finale of a 
series of mega-events. This paper is an attempt to examine how Guangzhou used the Asia 
Games strategically as a vehicle of fulfilling its development goals. 
Mega-events are characterised for their huge consequences upon host cities, considerable 
exposure to (global) media coverage and discontinuity (Horne and Manzenreiter, 2006). Studies 
often produce three major motivations behind the promotion of mega-events. First, mega-events 
are promoted as a political project to legitimise the host nation’s ruling regime, boost the 
national pride or attain a particular state vision (Black, 2007; Steenveld and Strelitz, 1998; Van 
der Westhuizen, 2004). Second, mega-events are seen as a means for political elites and 
businesses to form a growth coalition to pin down global capital and visitors in host cities 
(Gratton, 2005; Burbank et al., 2001). Third, from a local-central relations perspective, mega-
events are promoted by local elites to attract central state subsidies or grants in order to finance 
development projects (Cochrane et al., 1996). 
Guangzhou’s experience seems to diverge from these. Compared with the Beijing Olympic 
Games or the Shanghai World Expo, the Asian Games remained as a relatively low-key event 
so that the fame of the preceding two national events would not diminish too soon. This also 
suggests that Guangzhou’s experience might have more to tell beyond the promotion of national 
prestige. Furthermore, Guangzhou was not likely to use the Games as a means to attract central 
government subsidies to finance development projects: It had been enjoying China’s third 
largest city status (after Shanghai and Beijing) in terms of the gross regional product. 
Guangzhou is the capital city of the Guangdong province that commanded the largest provincial 
economy in mainland China. Nor did Guangzhou feel short of international visitors or global 
investment. As the host city of Canton Fair that has been the principal window of overseas trade 
for the whole China since the 1950s, Guangzhou as well as other cities in the Pearl River Delta 
(hereafter PRD) region have been inundated with international visitors and capital investment, 
including those originating from or channelled through Hong Kong. 
This paper uses Guangzhou’s experiences of hosting the 2010 Asian Games to illustrate 
Guangzhou’s engagement with scalar politics that includes both intra-regional restructuring and 
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a ‘negotiated scale-jump’ as a way of addressing its development vision. Instead of ‘breaking 
away’ from the central state, Guangzhou aimed at jumping scale to connect with the world 
under conditions negotiated in part with the state. In doing so, the promotion of Guangzhou as 
the international regional centre was what the municipality adopted as a discourse to justify the 
state intervention in the built environment through facilitating urban spatial restructuring and 
redevelopment. The discussions in this paper are based on the author’s qualitative in-depth 
interviews with key informants (ten government officials at district and municipal levels, seven 
academics and six professional experts including three working for international firms operating 
in Guangzhou),1 archival records and observation during field visits. These took place between 
September 2009 and May 2011. 
 
Spatial restructuring, event-led development and local-central state 
relations 
From the perspectives of globalisation and inter-urban competition, cities are  driven into 
competition for increasingly footloose investment capital, transnational firms and visitors. Many 
Western cities in particular have faced post-industrial structural changes that accompanied the 
declining competitiveness of traditional secondary industries as well as the demise of the 
Keynesian welfare statism. Under these circumstances, local states are viewed as being under 
pressure to become more entrepreneurial to address the problems of limited financial resources. 
Business interests rise as key partners of local states, forming a growth coalition with diverse 
sectors to promote “value-free development” and make localities more amenable to investors’ 
needs (Logan and Molotch, 1987). Various strategies emerge to support this process, including 
place promotion, image re-branding or signature architecture (Kavaratzis and Ashworth, 2005). 
The key to this process is to make sure mobile assets become ‘sticky’ to a locale through 
enacting developmental projects (Shin, 2007). 
Some post-industrial cities choose the path of promoting ‘consumption-oriented economic 
development’ that emphasises consumption activities such as sports and entertainment (Judd 
and Fainstein, 1999). Place-dependent local growth advocates have increasingly drawn towards 
using mega-event hosting as a vehicle to meet their growth desire (Burbank et al., 2001). Mega-
event hosting not only contributes to urban transformation for the pursuit of visitors’ pleasure 
                                                     
1 In order to understand the ways in which the municipality made use of the Asian Games to fulfill its 
own vision, the interviews focused on this particular group of informants who were closely involved in 
working with or for the government. Professionals included experts in urban design and architecture firms. 
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but also acts as a catalyst to event-led development, aimed at providing event facilities and 
supporting infrastructure (Smith, 2012). Projects are put forward in the name of mega-events, 
“even if they have little relevance to a sporting event” (Burbank et al., 2001:29). In this process, 
the role of the state is important, for it coordinates the circulation of surplus capital and its 
channelling into the built environment (Harvey, 1978). An event-led growth strategy may 
demonstrate the redefinition of the meaning of the state (Cochrane et al., 1996). 
The emphasis on local scales and the attention to cities in the broader framework of 
globalisation and inter-urban competition raises a question about local-central state relations. 
Such relations are compounded by ‘glocalisation’ processes that entail substantial changes to 
the scale of economic networks and regulatory arrangements. These changes involve the 
national scale shifting upwards to supra-national/global scales and simultaneously downwards 
to local/regional scales (Swyngedouw, 2004). Cities pursuing global investment and visitors 
may consequently experience inter-scalar tensions, often engaging in scalar politics to get things 
done. In particular, when facing conflicts and contestation over pursuing a particular regulatory 
project to enable local accumulation, place-dependent alliances at local scales may attempt to 
‘jump scale’, bypassing the central state and connecting directly with transnational actors (Park, 
2005). Following Neil Brenner who interprets globalisation as “a multi-scalar restructuring of 
capitalist territorial organization” (Brenner, 1999:68; original emphasis), the scale-jump is 
viewed as a deterritorialisation strategy that aims “to circumvent or dismantle historically 
entrenched forms of territorial organization and their associated scalar morphologies” (ibid.:62). 
While the scale-jump might be a denationalisation strategy, the importance of the nation-state 
scale does not diminish (Brenner, 1999). Scalar politics may also be employed by the socially 
disadvantaged in order “to resist oppression and exploitation at a higher scale”, as shown 
vividly by Neil Smith in his discussion of the Homeless Vehicle scheme in New York in the late 
1980s (Smith, 1992:60). Mega-events promoted by territorial alliances would also display how 
the scalar politics have played out at local, national and global scales. 
Shifting our attention to mainland China, it is questionable if mega-event hosting follows the 
post-industrial logic of consumption-oriented economic development. China’s mega-events 
have served multiple purposes such as pacifying social unrests, ensuring socio-political stability 
and facilitating capital accumulation and spatial restructuring (Brady, 2009; Broudehoux, 2007; 
Shin, 2012). China’s mega-events are also closely related with the recent regional development 
strategies, which have focused on producing mega-city regions, each of them centred on key 
sites of capital accumulation and political influence in respective regions (Wu and Zhang, 
2007). These include the Yangtze River Delta region centred on Shanghai and Hangzhou-
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Suzhou belt, the PRD region centred on Guangzhou and Shenzhen-Hong Kong link, and finally, 
the Beijing-Tianjin region. Not coincidentally, the three international mega-events in recent 
years were shared among the three city-regions. The competition between China’s city-regions 
is expected to become much fiercer, and place-based local entrepreneurialism more vigorous in 
the world-class city promotion (ibid.; Wu, 2007). 
While local states emerge as strong players in China’s urbanisation and global integration, how 
do they negotiate their growing territorial power with the central state. It may be possible to 
discuss the rise of local states that attempt to break away from the central state interference, as 
local states enhance their competitiveness and accumulation capacities, promoting place-based 
interests (Xu and Yeh, 2005; Zhu, 2004). Critics have also noted the increasing entrepreneurial 
behaviour of local states in promoting local development, leading to the rise of state 
entrepreneurialism (Duckett, 1996) or local state corporatism (Oi, 1995). Local states may 
endeavour to make directive investment decisions in order to concentrate finite resources on key 
areas identified in strategic development plans and to realise local leaders’ particular 
development visions (Wu and Zhang, 2007). Various spatial strategies have emerged to 
facilitate urban accumulation centred on using land resources (Lin, 2007). Hsing (2010) for 
instance discusses how urban governments have concentrated their resources on establishing 
‘new towns’, with real estate developers as key partners. Local states would also take an 
entrepreneurial approach to redevelopment in their pursuit of urban accumulation (Shin, 2009). 
Nevertheless, critics are also keen to emphasise the political importance of the central state in 
shaping local development agendas (Chen, 2009; Xu and Yeh, 2009). Central state support is 
crucial in promoting local reform experimentation. The rise of local states has benefited from 
various central state decisions to decentralise state power such as progressive fiscal and land 
reform, enabling local states to gain a greater control of locally raised revenues (Wu, 2009). 
Examining the rise of new community building initiatives in urban China, Heberer and Göbel 
further suggest that the central state efforts to enhance the local self-governance may be 
interpreted as “to enhance state control over society” by “instrumentalizing participation” 
(2011:4). A similar conclusion can be drawn with regard to the relationship between enhanced 
local state autonomy and the central state’s promotion of this. In other words, China’s local-
central state relations may indicate a dualist process of strong central statism and local state 
autonomy in times of state restructuring, decentralisation and global exposure of localities. 
Then, how can we reconcile the strong central state with the rise of local states? Guangzhou’s 
hosting the 2010 Asian Games might have been vital in order to keep or enhance their national 
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and regional position in China’s economic and political geography. Having faced increasing 
inter-regional competitions as well as scalar tensions involving the central state, it is argued 
herein that Guangzhou has actively used the Asian Games as a vehicle for the local state’s 
‘negotiated’ scale-jump in order to advance locally-driven development agenda under 
conditions negotiated in part with the overarching strong central state. 
 
Scalar Politics: Guangzhou, the PRD and the World 
Guangzhou’s long-term development vision has gone through major changes over the years. 
Guangzhou initially envisaged an “economic centre in southern China in the early 1990s” (Xu 
and Yeh, 2003:367), but over time, it added an international dimension. In 1995, Guangzhou 
proposed to “overtake the ‘four little dragons’ in Asia” by 2010, and become “an international 
metropolitan city, and the financial, trade and tourist centre in Asia-Pacific region” (Guangzhou 
Yearbook Editorial Committee, 1995 cited in Xu and Yeh, 2003:365-366). By late 1998, it 
envisioned a ‘regional central city in the world’ (ibid.:368). As Guangzhou had been making 
frequent references to Year 2010 (the final year of implementing the 11th Five-Year Plan) for 
streamlining its development projects, the 2010 Asian Games hosting came as a golden 
opportunity to realise its long-term vision to become a ‘world-class city’. 
Guangzhou is also the provincial capital of the Guangdong province, the largest provincial 
economy in China for many decades. This makes Guangzhou the political centre of the PRD 
region that has come to serve the global market as the ‘factory of the world’. Various projects 
including the construction of a brand new central business district (hereafter CBD) were 
conceived by the municipal officials as a means to prepare Guangzhou for the 21st century, 
promoting the city in the “world urban hierarchy as a regional international financial and service 
center” (Zhu et al., 2011:226). As local academics suggest, the Asian Games hosting could be 
interpreted as a means to achieve this strategy and gain recognition: 
“The Guangzhou government used the Asian Games just to promote the city’s level, because 
they wanted to develop Guangzhou as an important Asian city, like Seoul, Tokyo, Taipei and 
Singapore. Up to these cities’ level” (Dr Deng, Guangzhou Academy of Social Science 
(hereafter GZASS), 19 May 2011)2 
                                                     
2 All interviewee names are anonymised in this paper for confidentiality. 
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“Sporting events are yet a kind of, from the developing country’s perspective, a tool to 
participate in the global competition. Just a kind of means, because we require recognition under 
the globalisation, hence it [the government] thinks that we have to do this kind of thing” 
(Professor Lu, Sun Yat-sen University, 17 September 2009) 
However, Guangzhou’s global positioning comes with its careful negotiation with scalar 
politics, which involves (i) the consideration of domestic tensions in  central-local state 
relations; and (ii) the process of city-region rescaling in Guangdong. The rest of this section 
deals with each of these elements. First, the promotion of the Asian Games signals a more 
complex central-local relationship in the regional development process. While China’s cities 
come to possess greater power to raise local revenues through decentralisation and carry out 
strategic plans for local growth, the central state continues to play an important role and 
attempts to retain its power through various measures of state reconstruction (Xu and Yeh, 
2009). Expert interviewees often point out that Guangzhou remains the third most important 
city in mainland China after Beijing and Shanghai. For instance, “Guangzhou is happy to be in 
the third position, with Shanghai being the economic centre and Beijing the political/cultural 
centre” (Dr Fang, Sun Yat-sen University, 16 May 2011). This hierarchical notion was also 
reflected in the hierarchy of mega-events hosted by the three cities in terms of their relative 
importance to the country. While the three events were awarded very close to each other time-
wise, it seems that the central government was keen to make sure the glory of the Beijing 
Olympic Games and the Shanghai World Expo were ensured, and to keep the Asian Games a 
lower key. According to an interviewee: 
“Before the Beijing Olympic Games, the central government asked the Guangzhou government 
to do this Asian Games preparation in a very subtle way, not [to make] that high profile. But 
after the [Olympic] Games, the central government still had to celebrate the success of the 
Olympic Games, so for that part, no one paid attention to the Asian Games. Then, the [Shanghai] 
exhibition event is also international rather than Asian only. So that is why it is not a good time 
for the Asian Games to be held” (Ms Heng, Planner, 15 September 2009) 
Second, the rescaling of the PRD places Guangzhou in competition with other cities in the 
region to become the regional ‘dragon head’. The hosting of the Asian Games symbolises 
Guangzhou’s supremacy in this competition. While interviewees often referred to the fact that 
Beijing was able to mobilise not only their own but the national resources to make the Olympic 
Games successful, it was equally pointed out that Guangzhou was on its own without much 
financial support from the provincial government either. When the municipal government 
produced a comprehensive plan for the provision of Games venues and related facilities, the 
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provincial contribution to the total planned expenditure was only about 4.7 percent, while the 
municipality was to contribute 39.3 percent and the rest from what the government termed as 
‘social investment’ (shehui touzi in Chinese), that is, investment mostly coming from the state- 
and the private-sector companies and put into real estate and infrastructure projects such as the 
Asian Games village and the Phase II development of Guangzhou’s international airport 
(GZASS, 2006). Municipal officials also pursued economic ties with neighbouring countries 
and special administrative regions. As the Head of the Guangzhou Foreign Trade and Economic 
Cooperation Bureau explicitly stated, “Guangzhou will make good use of the sports gala to 
maximally promote trade and economic cooperation” (China Daily, 2010). To some extent, 
Guangzhou’s less dependence on the central state subsidy reflects the city’s confidence:  
“China’s three big metropolises, now we say mega-city regions: one is in Beijing, another in 
Shanghai and the other in Guangzhou. All are considerably well-developed areas in China. And 
these areas like to be made world-known, world-famous. They have got a competition. At first, 
Beijing successfully won the [bid to host] the Olympic Games, and then Shanghai this World 
Expo... And then, the Guangzhou government said, ‘we would like to follow up’, to also have 
something, important event to show to the world our development level, also our ability to 
control and organise this kind of event” (Professor Xi, GZASS, 16 September 2009) 
Guangzhou also faces intra-regional competition with cities like Shenzhen and Hong Kong. The 
central government produced a regional policy to promote the national development around five 
national central cities in the mainland, that is Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, Chongqing and 
Guangzhou. This acknowledged the importance of Guangzhou, the only non-provincial-level 
city to be included in this designation. Guangzhou’s supremacy in the region was also 
frequently pointed out by local experts:  
“Compared to other cities in the PRD region, Guangzhou is the most developed, 
knowing how to govern, control and deal with all the development problems, so it can 
be the centre of the PRD region” (Dr Que, Guangzhou Commercial College, 17 May 2011). 
Regarding the competition between Guangzhou and Hong Kong, the State Council approval of 
the Outline Plan for the Reform and Development of the Pearl River Delta (hereafter 2008 
Outline Plan) in December 2008 seemed to have resolved Guangzhou’s concern. The 2008 
Outline Plan placed the Guangdong province (and hence Guangzhou) in the driving seat when it 
came to its competition with Hong Kong (Cheung, 2012). The 2008 Outline Plan also put 
Shenzhen as a platform for various economic innovation while confirming Guangzhou as the 
political and cultural centre. This effort by Guangzhou to lead the development of the PRD 
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reflected the Guangdong provincial government’s strategic aim to “build the cluster cities 
connecting Hong Kong, Shenzhen and Guangzhou, and develop the PRD metropolitan area as 
the cluster of world-class cities” during the 12th five-year development plan (2011-2015) (Dr 
Deng, 19 May 2011). 
Guangzhou’s development vision and the city’s attempt to realise it through the Asian Games 
preparation has resulted in some economic success. As shown in Table 1, while the country as a 
whole was experiencing an average growth rates of 9.76 and 11.21 percent during the 10th and 
11th five-year economic period respectively, Guangzhou outperformed these, registering nearly 
14 percent annually during the ten-year period. Accordingly, Guangzhou displayed high 
productivity with its per capita GDP of 87,458 yuan in 2010: this was twice as high as that of 
the Guangdong province, and about 15 percent higher than those of Beijing and Shanghai. In 
fact, Guangzhou’s high growth rates during the last ten years enabled it to overtake Shanghai’s 
productivity. Guangzhou’s rapid development is also reflected in the rise of urban residents’ 
income. By 2010, Guangzhou became almost on par with Beijing or Shanghai in terms of urban 
residents’ disposable income, and also considerably reduced the income gap in comparison with 
Shenzhen. 
(Table 1 here) 
 
Condensed urban spatial restructuring 
Guangzhou’s long-term development vision was aided further by the Asian Games serving as a 
vehicle for addressing urban spatial restructuring to enhance its own production/accumulation 
capacities. The contribution of the Asian Games to Guangzhou’s urban space primarily lies in 
facilitating and speeding up the completion of key projects in line with the city’s comprehensive 
strategic plans. Between 2005 and 2010, key development projects were fast-tracked, receiving 
resources and preferential treatments when they met two conditions: (a) projects addressing the 
needs of the Games hosting itself (e.g. facilities and transport infrastructure) and (b) strategic 
projects in line with the city’s long-term development vision. The Asian Games enabled 
Guangzhou to spend only “five years to achieve ten-year amount of construction”, allowing the 
growth of “GDP from so many construction projects” (Interview with Dr Deng, GZASS, 19 
May 2011). In particular, the Asian Games enabled the Guangzhou municipality to consolidate 
its long-term ambition to transform the city from a city of single core (centred on old city 
districts) to a multi-centric city (Lu and McCarthy, 2008). 
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The Guangzhou municipality produced an important strategic planning document in 2000 
known as 2000 Concept Plan. In fact, Guangzhou is noted as China’s first city to have put 
forward a strategic development plan in the form of a ‘concept plan’ that reflected local elites’ 
visions (Wu and Zhang, 2007). The 2000 Concept Plan clarified the city’s spatial development 
strategies by proposing the concept of “advancement in the east, linkage in the west, 
optimisation in the north, expansion in the south” (Lu and McCarthy, 2008:459). After 
Guangzhou’s successful bid for the Asian Games in July 2004, it produced the Outline of Urban 
Planning and Construction for Guangzhou’s 2010 Asian Games (hereafter 2004 Outline Plan), 
which had been “the principal guiding document” for Guangzhou’s urban development “during 
the six-year period from 2004 as well as the post-Asian Games period” (Mr Wang, Urban 
Planner, 4 September 2010). The 2004 Outline Plan identified ‘two cores and four cities’ as 
strategic sites of urban intervention for spatial restructuring, most of which overlapped with key 
areas identified in the previous 2000 Concept Plan. These sites included Tianhe New Town 
Urban Core and Guangzhou New Town Core as two major urban cores, and Olympic Games 
New Town, University Town, Baiyun New Town and Huadi New Town as four cities. 
Guangzhou’s ambitious promotion of these new growth centres demonstrated the city’s shifting 
emphasis on spatial approaches to urban development from a ‘development district (kaifaqu)’ 
strategy to a ‘new town construction’ (xincheng jianshe) strategy, a path that is being replicated 
by many other Chinese cities in recent years (Hsing, 2010). The latter strategy was employed 
particularly in rural areas at the urban fringe, which were brought under the control of urban 
governments for the acquisition of land-premium through the sales of ‘granted land use-rights’ 
to developers (ibid.). 
The development of the Tianhe New Town Urban Core (hereafter Tianhe UC) is pivotal in 
Guangzhou’s urban development and is further scrutinised here. Originally, the city’s 14th 
masterplan, approved by the State Council in 1984, envisaged a compact development plan with 
three urban cores consisting of (i) the old city districts, (ii) Tianhe as a business district, and (iii) 
Huangpu as an industrial concentration (Xu and Yeh, 2003:365). Part of the business functions 
originally located in the old city districts (especially around the Garden Hotel area in Yuexiu 
District) therefore began to shift towards Tianhe District. This transition was facilitated by 
Guangzhou’s hosting of the 6th National Games in 1987, which led to the construction of sports 
complex in Tianhe District and signalled the expansion of Guangzhou’s urban core functions to 
the east (Lu and McCarthy, 2008:451-452). The Tianhe UC, as laid out in the 2004 Outline 
Plan, was an ambitious intervention to create a new North-South axis, which extended from the 
Guangzhou East Rail Station in Tianhe District to Lijiao village at the southern tip of Haizhu 
District. The key areas encompassed the Tianhe Sports Complex and the Pearl River New Town 
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as Guangzhou’s new CBD for the 21st century as well as the substantial expansion of the 
Chinese Export Commodities Fair (CECF) Pazhou Complex where regular trade fairs are held. 
In particular, the development of the Pearl River New Town (Zhujiang Xincheng in Chinese; 
hereafter PRNT) has received a strong emphasis as it lies in the centre of the Tianhe UC. As the 
Party Secretary of Guangzhou stated, the PRNT was to become the Guangzhou version of 
‘Lujiazui’, the locus of Shanghai’s new CBD in Pudong (Yangcheng Evening News, 2009). 
Resources were concentrated to complete the long-delayed construction of the PRNT, which 
was originally perceived in its first masterplan produced in 1993. What were empty lots with 
skeleton streets until the mid-2000s went through full-scale transformation to be made 
presentable by the time of the Asian Games opening (see Figure 1). The PRNT consisted of a 
1.5-kilometre-long boulevard, Guangzhou’s version of “Champs Élysées” (Interview with 
Professor Xi, GZASS, 16 September 2009), along with iconic buildings such as the Zaha 
Hadid-designed Opera House and the Wilkinson Eyre-designed Guangzhou International 
Financial Centre. Guangzhou TV Tower, another flagship project to build China’s tallest 
structure, was located right across the Pearl River along the North-South axis. The use of 
international architecture firms and iconic buildings has gained popularity in Chinese cities as a 
quick solution to raise city profiles (Ren, 2011) and Guangzhou was no exception. The whole 
process was facilitated to ensure key projects were complete in time for the Games opening. An 
international architect explains: 
“At that time, the party secretary and the city authority were very keen to make the building 
complete as quickly as possible before the Asian Games, so the method they used was that the 
government organised the design competition, then also organised efforts to find the master 
design, and then appointed state-owned enterprise as a developer to actually deliver it...It was a 
very highly political event” (Interview with an international architect, 29 September 2009). 
(Figure 1 here) 
The use of the Asian Games also seemed to have enabled the Guangzhou municipality to secure 
an extra quota of construction land for more development projects. Critics often point out that 
China’s urbanisation has been a process of land-based accumulation, in which land becomes an 
important asset for government finance and its development an integral component of economic 
development (Hsing, 2010; Wu et al., 2007). In recent years, converting agricultural land to 
urban use had been controlled through the central state’s assertion of the land quota system, 
determined by five-to-ten year land use planning with annual targets (Xu and Yeh, 2009). The 
draft outline of Guangzhou’s land use planning for the 12th Five-Year (2011-2015) Plan states 
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that Guangzhou had seen a rapid increase in demand for construction lands in order to address 
domestic need and prepare the Asian Games (GMLRHAB, 2011). Despite the annual allocation 
of 17.03 square kilometres of new construction lands by the provincial government during the 
11th Five-Year Plan period, Guangzhou experienced a shortage of 6.42 square kilometres on 
average each year: In 2010 alone, Guangzhou had 12.83-square-kilometre project sites, which 
could not apply for the land use permission because the municipality used up its quota for the 
year (ibid.:7-8). Under these constraints, the Games preparation allowed the municipality to 
gain more construction land outside the official land use quota allocation. As Ms Wu from the 
Guangzhou Municipal Bureau of Planning explains, “projects marked for the Asian Games 
would enable the acquisition of an extra quota, which was mostly used for expressways and 
transportation facilities...These facilities work for the Asian Games, and also work for 
Guangzhou, and the extra quota is used to build the expressway...while the original quota 
allocated to the expressway construction could be sold” (Ms Wu, 15 September 2009). Major 
projects for the Asian Games also received “green light” when processing applications for land 
use permission so that “they were given a priority” (ibid.). 
Economic indicators demonstrate how Guangzhou gained from the concentration of resources in 
its investment in the built environment. In terms of year-on-year growth rates of total fixed asset 
investments between 2005 and 2010, Guangzhou showed generally a better performance than 
other cities such as Beijing, Shanghai and Shenzhen (see Table 1). While the global financial 
crisis also hit China and especially the PRD region’s export industry, Guangzhou’s economic 
growth was not much deterred between 2008 and 2010. The Guangzhou Asian Games 
facilitated the concentration of locally-driven investment activities in times of the Games 
preparation.  
 
Selective surgical intervention for redevelopment and beautification 
Promoting Guangzhou as a world-class city accompanies a large scale of urban make-over. The 
2010 Asian Games also served as a vehicle to lay the foundation for urban redevelopment to 
exploit the city’s real estate development potential. Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, city-
wide redevelopment of dilapidated urban space had been challenging, especially due to the high 
density of population and building, and high costs of relocating and re-housing local Guangzhou 
residents. The preparation for the Asian Games provided justification to speed up the progress 
of urban redevelopment by implementing urban beautification in old city districts in particular 
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and making strategic interventions in selective redevelopment project sites. In other words, 
while the intense restructuring of urban spatial configuration in Guangzhou involved the city’s 
outward expansion to build new urban centres in suburban areas, it has also sought inward 
densification, looking for sites of accumulation through redevelopment. 
Government investments were poured into improving Guangzhou’s appearance and renovating 
building facades, and make the city more ‘presentable’ to visitors and to the media. In the words 
of the then Party Secretary of Guangzhou, “the imminent task is to take the Asian Games as a 
moment to ensure the substantial change to the city’s environmental appearance by 2010” 
(Yangcheng Evening News, 2009). Environmental improvement projects were to be carried out 
in “1512 neighbourhoods whose total areas reach 237.95 square kilometres, subjecting 3.57 
million people” (ibid.). Beautification initiatives, locally known as “chuanyi daimao” (meaning 
dressing), were to involve about 73,510 buildings located along the city’s 735-kilometre-long 
main arteries as well as those areas adjacent to sport venues (ibid.; Xinxi Shibao, 2009). 
Beautification projects were more pronounced in the old city districts, which were to present 
cultural experiences to tourists and athletes at the time of the Games opening (Interview with 
Professor Lu, Sun Yat-sen University, 17 September 2009). Furthermore, the city-wide 
redevelopment of dilapidated neighbourhoods received a great emphasis by the district and 
municipal governments, promoted under the name of the Games preparation, as “leaders called 
for the improvement of urban appearance” (Interview with Mr Teng, Planning Officer at the 
Haizhu District Government, 21 September 2009). The municipality frequently made a 
reference to the 2010 Asian Games as the deadline for implementing urban redevelopment 
projects. 
The preparation for the Asian Games and beautification gave impetus to the city-wide 
promotion of a new urban policy (‘Three Olds’ redevelopment) to accelerate Guangzhou’s 
urban redevelopment. After the provincial government’s emphasis in 2009 (Ye, 2011), this 
policy was put into practice upon the announcement of the key government document on 31 
December 2009 (Guangzhou Municipal Government, 2009). The Three Olds areas referred to 
old towns, old industrial plants and old villages. Sources indicate that the size of urban areas 
that were subject to the Three Olds policy reached 318 square kilometres spanning across 10 
districts (Nanfang Daily, 2010). The majority of these target areas (53 percent) were villages-in-
the-city (hereafter VICs), which were former rural villages with a high concentration of migrant 
tenants accommodated in informal dwellings, built by village landlords for rental income. 
About 38 percent were old industrial plants, while the remaining nine percent were old town 
areas (ibid.). A special municipal taskforce organ called the Guangzhou Urban Redevelopment 
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Office (Sanjiuban in Chinese meaning Three Olds Office) was established in February 2010 to 
oversee the municipal progress and approve redevelopment plans for project sites. 
The Asian Games hosting provided the early impetus, being frequently cited as a means to 
enable the initial kick-off of redevelopment projects. In other words, the Asian Games had been 
the founding stone for the strategic government interventions in Guangzhou’s inception of the 
Three Olds redevelopment policy. As a planner indicates: 
“Maybe Guangzhou thinks they want to take this chance to renovate all the old buildings. Like 
Guangzhou’s 2000-year history, the villages are quite old and the government wants to have a 
reason to do something. Then the Asian Games should be a very good reason. Even the country 
would support the Guangzhou government to do all these things, and turn on the green light to 
do a lot of things” (Interview with Ms Heng, 15 September 2009) 
Streamlining these interventions, district governments repeatedly short-listed redevelopment 
project sites, making a clear reference to the opening of the Asian Games to facilitate work 
progress. As a planning official from an inner-city district government succinctly points out, the 
speed of urban redevelopment “could not have been so fast”, were it not for the Asian Games 
(Mr Pu, 22 September 2009). For instance, the district government of Tianhe, where the PRNT 
was located, produced a list of key construction projects in the summer of 2009, which aimed at 
completing the overall transformation of its VICs (Nanfang Daily, 2009). The plan included the 
completion of Liede village redevelopment by June 2010, of the wholesale demolition of Xian 
village located adjacent to the PRNT and of Xiaoxintang village located near the Guangzhou 
Olympic Sports Complex (ibid.). The demolition of Xian and Xiaoxintang villages were 
particularly emphasised by the Tianhe district mayor who stated that “no matter how many 
problems are faced, Xiancun and Xintang village are going to be demolished before the Asian 
Games”, also emphasising the importance of persuading the local residents (ibid.). 
The three VICs above (Liede, Xian and Xiaoxintang) were also part of the nine VICs that the 
municipal government gave top priority to wholesale clearance before the opening of the Asian 
Games (New Express Daily, 2010). The other six included: Linhe village in Tianhe; Pazhou 
village in Haizhu; Yangji village in Yuexiu; Sanyuanli, Tangxia and Xiaogang village in Baiyun 
(see Figure 2).3 A glance at the location of these nine VICs would make it clear why they were 
selected. For instance, the demolition of Linhe, Xian, Liede and Pazhou were deemed important 
as they were all part of the new Tianhe UC: Pazhou was located east of the new Chinese Export 
                                                     
3 Sources suggest that these villages used to accommodate a large number of migrant tenants: for instance, Tangxia 
and Xiaogang villages were known to have housed about 50,000 migrants each. 
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Commodities Fair (CECF) Pazhou Complex, while the other three were all adjacent to the 
PRNT under construction. Baiyun’s three VICs were all situated close to the Baiyun New 
Town, one of the four centres as explained earlier. 
(Figure 2 here) 
The prioritised selection of these nine villages was clearly conforming to the city’s Asian 
Games preparation. However, such earmarking of wholesale clearance suggests that while the 
municipal government was interested in beautifying the city, the Games also acted as an 
effective justification to initiate the municipality’s long-anticipated redevelopment of 
dilapidated and obsolete urban spaces. The initiation of clearance before the Games was to lay 
the foundation for the post-Games reconstruction and hence the acceleration of Three Olds 
projects. Figure 2 shows the redevelopment status of those nine priority VICs at the time of the 
Asian Games opening. While the demolition work in Baiyun’s three VICs did not progress as 
fast as the government would have hoped for, the other six villages in Tianhe, Yuexiu and 
Haizhu districts saw the commencement or completion of demolition by November 2010. The 
redevelopment of Liede village was completed just in time for the commencement of the Asian 
Games, presumably due to its proximity to both the PRNT and the Haixinsha Island where the 
opening ceremony of the Asian Games was held.  
The spatial restructuring is not conflict-free. In particular, preparations for mega-events often 
involve displacement of local residents. In the case of Guangzhou’s nine VICs whose 
redevelopment was prioritised for completion by the opening of the Asian Games (see Figure 
2), 16,000 original village households and a much higher number of migrant tenants were to be 
affected by the demolition. Mega-events are often pursued by top-down decision-making, and 
this may worsen conflicts over space (Hayes and Horne, 2011). Previous studies on the Beijing 
Olympic Games also suggest that the costs were borne by socio-economically marginalised 
groups (Shin, 2012; Shin and Li, forthcoming). Ironically, these costs were often borne without 
huge protests due to the prevailing ideological imposition by the state that attributed a great 
degree of national significance to the successful hosting of the Games (ibid.). Within 
Guangzhou, the extensive spatial restructuring has incurred various protests by local residents to 
defend their right to housing and land (see Shin, 2013 for example), directed often at the 
‘predatory’ local states than the ‘benign’ central state (So, 2007). However, protests against the 
Asian Games itself seemed to have been rare. 
 
 17 | P a g e  
Conclusion 
The 2010 Guangzhou Asian Games was the concluding moment of China’s endeavour to stage 
the country in the world. While the Beijing Olympic Games and the Shanghai World Expo were 
more closely associated with the nationalist sentiment (endorsing the achievement of China’s 
economic and political rise in the world), the Asian Games remained comparatively a low-key 
event. As the provincial capital of the Guangdong province, Guangzhou’s preparation for the 
Asian Games was used in such a way as to sustain its own standing in the country while 
attempting to realise its development vision to become a world-class city as well as the 
international regional centre. The city’s engagement with the scalar politics is a realisation of 
multi-scalar activities that involve both intra-provincial competition and ‘negotiated scale-
jump’.  
The city’s experience of hosting the Games provides some important lessons for our 
understanding of how regional cities may pursue their development goals under the strong 
central state, and how event-led development contributes to this. First, Guangzhou’s experience 
signals the rise of a regional city that attempts to ‘jump scale’ to connect with the world and re-
position itself as the international regional centre. However, this ‘scale-jump’ is not what often 
tends to result from more conflictual local-central relations in which the place-dependent 
alliances at local scales might face confrontational central state (Park, 2005). Guangzhou’s 
‘scale-jump’ strategy is locally driven within a uniquely different context of the strong state. For 
Guangzhou, its ‘scale-jump’ was negotiated in that it (together with the Guangdong province) 
had to engage in constant negotiations with the central state to test the limit of their geopolitical 
expansion. This was testified in Guangzhou’s positioning as the third largest city without 
explicit attempts to surpass Beijing or Shanghai, while making sure that they stay above Tianjin 
or Shenzhen and become an influential regional centre, both domestically and internationally. 
The Asian Games was used strategically as a way of making possible this double-edged 
development strategy. 
To this extent, Guangzhou’s experience testifies to the continuing importance of the scale of 
nation-state in China urban studies. Unlike the contemporary understanding of ‘scale-jump’ as a 
deterritorial or denationalising strategy in times of globalisation (Brenner, 1999), Guangzhou’s 
‘scale-jump’ is a process of re-nationalising to ensure maximum political and economic gains 
are achieved in a reshaped central-local state relationship. In other words, in the midst of intense 
competition among local states in China in times of economic decentralisation and China’s 
ascendency in the global market, China’s local states attempt to jump scale upward (connecting 
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with transnational capital or supranational agencies) or downward (promoting intra-regional 
reconfiguration of territorial organisations). These attempts are realised only through the 
mediation of and negotiation with the central state. This process of a ‘negotiated scale-jump’ is 
crucial for China’s Party State whose primary concern is to ensure national political stability 
(Shin, 2012) and who has been strengthening its control through various means including 
stronger management of local Party cadres (Edin, 2003). 
Second, Guangzhou’s developmental pursuit to become a domestic and international regional 
centre was supported firmly by the spatial manifestation of the city’s strategic development 
plans. The Asian Games experience testifies to the transformative role of local governments in 
their entrepreneurial push for urban accumulation through spatial restructuring and urban 
redevelopment for land resource mobilisation and urban make-over. The preparation for the 
Games reflected the expansionary boosterism that typified the decades-long development of 
China’s cities, built on heavy productive investment in fixed assets. For Guangzhou, this 
expansionary boosterism had been justified by the city’s development vision to become the 
international regional centre and a world-class city. Guangzhou’s hosting of the 2010 Asian 
Games provided the city with a window of opportunities to initiate and streamline its long-
anticipated development projects, defending fast-tracked fixed asset investments. These 
investments were using mostly the city’s own resources, which contrasts strongly with what has 
been reported in Western, post-industrial cities that rely heavily on global investment or central 
state subsidies. Instead of mega-events acting as a prerequisite for future development, mega-
event hosting itself was embedded in the stream of speculative investments in fixed assets to 
ensure urban development and capital accumulation. 
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Figure 1: 
Transformation of the Pearl River New Town, 2000 - 2010  
(c) Google Earth Satellite Images (top three) and Author’s Pictures (bottom three) 
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Figure 2: 
Nine prioritised VICs and their redevelopment status by the Asian Games opening  
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Table 1: Comparative summary statistics of economic development in Guangzhou 
 
 
 
 
